Working Group II - Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
Despite the post-Cold War decline in public attention, the threats posed by nuclear weapons proliferation and an apathetic international resolve on nuclear disarmament remain potentially catastrophic. What are some of the challenges and lessons learned by the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime in the past decades? How can we rekindle a spirit of common purpose in international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament governance in the next decade?
These were amongst the very many questions the working group on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament grappled with during the first GG2020 session in Berlin.
- Fellows of the non-proliferation and disarmament working
group exploring different trajectories for selected factors.
In defining the challenge for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the international institutions tasked with nuclear security, the working group agreed that reducing the risk of intentional nuclear detonation will be the primary objective for these institutions in the year 2020.
Lively and vivid exchanges of ideas then followed with the fellows identifying an extensive list of factors that influence nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in the global governance arena and those which may influence it in the future. Before doing so, the working group agreed on some basic, yet crucial, definitions including how to define “nuclear states” versus “threshold states”. Broadly identified components of the problem included nuclear terrorism, state to state deterrence, rouge state proliferation, indigenous development of nuclear weapons capability, energy related issues and the role of other weapons including missiles, delivery systems and missile defense.
The more specific factors identified that could influence the non-proliferation regime included the number of additional nuclear states, legitimacy of the nuclear security regime, threat perception of national regimes, number of nuclear weapons, wars involving at least one nuclear state, non-nuclear major acts of terrorism against a nuclear state, strategic restraint, prominence of nuclear weapons in the US Security Strategy, cooperation between great powers, domestic regime collapse in nuclear or threshold state, advances in nuclear detection technology, ease of production of nuclear weapons and the possibility of non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons. From this, a set of crucial factors were selected and different trajectories for these factors were explored and analyzed using instruments provided by the field of future research, including trend analysis and scenario planning approaches.
- Richard Gowan speaking to the GG2020
fellows of the non-proliferation and
disarmament working group during the
GG2020 session in Berlin.
In the process of deciphering the numerous factors that will influence and determine the future of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament governance, the fellows were supported by Richard Gowan, Associate Director for Policy at the Center on International Cooperation, New York University, and Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, who joined the group for an afternoon of lively discussions. His experience in multilateral security arrangements and in-depth knowledge on international institutions enriched the debates in the working group and the fellows understanding of the system of factors.
The fellows engaged in animated discussion while determining the influence each of the crucial factors has on the others and the level of impact which results. The discussions allowed overlapping ideas as well as clear divergences to emerge in the process. The fellows engaged in intense debates with positions often times shifting from one camp to another which also allowed for interesting perspectives to emerge in the process.
At this point, the fellows had the opportunity to visit Ambassador Andreas Michaelis, Director-General for Middle Eastern Affairs and North Africa at the German Federal Foreign Office. The group took the opportunity to present their finding in the working group and tested their ideas with the political realities faced by policy-makers. Ambassador Michaelis shared with the working group some of his ideas and observations on the fellows work while adding some of his knowledge in the process and sharpening the group’s scenarios.
Before reconvening in Shanghai in July 2010 for the next GG2020 session, the fellows will drive forward the development of their scenarios, working and testing with new ideas and adjusting old ones. During the Shanghai session, the fellows will use their refined model to track down the levers that can be used to adjust crucial parameters, ultimately moving the system of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament governance into a direction that will keep us from the nuclear precipice.
